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of a wide range of attempts to answer the problem; the latter requires the 
putative instances of projective willing to be described in rich phenom-
enological detail. Inevitably, there will be much for readers to criticise and 
disagree about; it will be for each reader to decide whether Part Two leaves 
any viable option still open to the defender of eudaimonism and whether 
Part Three provides compelling evidence for the reality of projective will-
ing in Davenport’s sense. But I think there is no doubt that Davenport has 
made a compelling case and has presented in rich detail a powerful alter-
native to a deeply entrenched way of thinking. And whether or not one 
ultimately agrees with him, I think no reader could fail to learn much from 
his painstaking analyses. This is a remarkable and wonderfully thought-
provoking book.
Ontology and Providence in Creation: Taking Ex Nihilo Seriously, by Mark Ian 
Thomas Robson. New York: Continuum, 2008. Pp. xi + 223. $130 (hardback).
SAMEER YADAV, Duke University Divinity School
In this ambitious work, Mark Robson attempts to unseat a venerable 
philosophical tradition of understanding God’s creatio ex nihilo widely 
held since its seminal articulation by Leibniz, one framed in modal terms 
according to which creation consists in the actualization of a determinate 
possible world. The ontological assumption for most modal theories 
whose formal semantics are rooted in the Leibnizian idiom of “possible-
worlds” is that all possible objects are completely determinate individu-
als. Thus, although I have actually composed this on a laptop, I might 
have composed it on a desktop. As a way the world could have been, this 
possibility is general, for I have not specified whether the desktop would 
have been a PC or a Mac, or what software I would have used, and so on. 
But this possibility is not thereby indeterminate, for there is a fact of the 
matter about what might have been the case as regards each of these fur-
ther specifications, as well as innumerable other ones. Any one maximally 
specified and logically consistent description (while in practice impossible 
to render explicit) would tell us exactly one way that the world logically 
could have been—a possible world. Having not fully specified the state 
of affairs of my having composed this review on a desktop, my asser-
tion of the general possibility therefore includes many such determinate 
possibilities, thereby expressing a range of possible worlds. Each possible 
desktop in this range, as an exponent of a different possible world, is a 
fully determinate individual possible object.
According to those philosophical theologians in the Leibnizian tradition 
of modal ontology (and its formalized semantics post-Kripke), it is just 
this sort of determinacy about possibilia that characterizes God’s exhaus-
tive knowledge prior to creation. God’s creation of the world was simply 
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the actualization of a single determinate possible world from among the 
vast range of all possible worlds, wherein God’s will brought it about that 
that world came to be instantiated externally to the divine mind. Hence 
God’s act of creation according to this model does not accomplish any sort 
of gain in determinacy between the possible and the actual, but only what 
Robson characterizes as a “copying” of one particular possible world envi-
sioned in the divine mind “out into extra-mental reality” (11). It is this sort 
of creation as “copying” that Robson finds objectionable. Philosophically, 
he objects to our admitting into our ontology determinate possibilia as 
genuine objects of reference, whether as individuals or predicates. Theo-
logically, he objects that a Leibnizian doctrine of creation is not genuinely 
a creation out of nothing, but rather a creation out of possibilia—eternally 
pre-existent entities in the divine mind. This, he thinks, gives creation 
an insufficient independence from God’s determinative foreknowledge 
and implies a sort of “unsurprisingness”; a lack of real novelty that un-
dermines God’s creative capacities and his bestowal of those capacities 
upon us as God’s creatures (15). In response to this, Robson offers in Part 
1 (chapters 1–6) the constructive centerpiece to the book, an indeterminate 
account of modality modeled on C. S. Peirce’s analysis of the mathematical 
continuum and theologically interpreted as the creative capacity of the 
divine will.
What, then, is a “continuum analysis” of modality, and why should we 
reject the determinate conception of possibility assumed by the Leibnizian 
picture? As to what is inherently problematic about the Leibnizian view, 
Robson has curiously little to say. While he offers an admirably clear ex-
position of modern theories of modality in chapter 2, that exposition is 
marked by unnecessary elaborations detailing how various metaphysical 
accounts of modality differently construe the determinacy of possibilia. 
This serves no clear purpose, since it is only the minimal and obvious fact 
that they assume determinacy which is relevant for establishing the view 
he’s rejecting. The chapter closes with a brief and hastily appropriated 
recounting of Quine’s criticism that non-actual possibilia have no criterion 
of individuation and Ruth Barcan Marcus’s claim that determinate pos-
sibilia lack names that can fix their reference in contexts non-coextensive 
with the actual. Given Robson’s project, these criticisms should have been 
developed earlier and at greater length, so that his subsequent engage-
ment with representative modal theories could have assessed whether 
influential ways of reading an ontology of determinate possibilia off of 
a possible-worlds semantics can avoid these problems. Instead, he puzz-
lingly offers little argumentation for the inadequacy of a determinate 
conception of possibilia. Remarkably, Robson simply takes the barring of 
mere possibilia in Marcus’s formal semantics as an ontologically intuitive 
position, whereas he thinks it altogether counterintuitive to suppose that 
there is a realm of metaphysical (or broadly logical) non-actual possibilia 
to which we can refer (consisting in such things as properties that are not 
exemplified but might have been, states of affairs that do not obtain but 
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could occur, and propositions which are false but could have been true) 
(205). But if it is indeed intuitive plausibility Robson wishes to champion, 
the shoe is arguably on the other foot. Marcus’s radical actualism is valid 
as a formula in one system of quantified modal logic, but when abstract-
ing it as a claim about the nature of possibility it seems obviously false. 
Ordinary language is replete with what we take to be genuine references 
to mere possibilia. We customarily regard propositions such as “Wittgen-
stein could have gotten married and had children, but instead died single 
and childless” as having a truth value, even if it is never entertained by 
anyone. Prima facie, it is most plausible to think that even if the occasion 
to think about it never arose for anyone, Wittgenstein nevertheless in fact 
could have both coupled and sired. It is equally plausible to recognize that 
if this is so, then the world would have been the same in some respects 
and different in others, even though a maximal specification of this is be-
yond our ken. It seems bizarre to think that the truth of this proposition 
depends in any way on our cognition, although obviously recognizing or 
formulating the proposition does. Contrary to Robson’s curious presup-
position, philosophical argument is not required to establish the assump-
tion of determinate possibilia as embedded in our everyday discourse, but 
is rather required to dislodge it. But it is precisely such an argument that 
he does not give us.
Robson’s alternative model for thinking about possibilia in chapters 3–5 
is founded on a Piercean interpretation of Zeno’s paradox, wherein the 
infinite divisibility of a line into segments illumines the problem of taking 
anything essentially continuous (motion, time, etc.) to be ultimately com-
posed of determinate individual points. Pierce rejects Cantor’s solution 
for retaining a compositional interpretation of continua and generalizes 
the mathematical case into a definition of possibility as having a similarly 
continuous nature, i.e., providing the general conditions governing the 
potential and actual realization of an individual or an aggregate of indi-
viduals, rather than fundamentally “containing” or “hiding” such entities 
compositionally (45). Possibilia, then, are not unactualized determinate 
individuals, propositions, properties or states of affairs, but indeterminate 
continua. Thus, exhaustive knowledge of all possibilia can only be knowl-
edge of a complex set of general conditions, and not of any such determi-
nate objects. These latter become determinate objects of knowledge only 
when the potentiality of some relevant continuum (e.g., redness) issues in 
the realization of a particular (a red thing). Robson relies on Hartshorne 
in applying his analysis of possibilia as indeterminate to God’s knowl-
edge prior to creation, which, as a knowledge of possibilities, could only 
have been a knowledge of unspecifiable potentiality and not a detailed 
knowledge of what the actual world would be like. This he takes to im-
ply God’s necessary learning about the world as it unfolds unpredictably 
from indeterminate potentiality to determinately realized actuality. Chap-
ter 6 argues that the indeterminacy of continua as the potentialities out of 
which God created the world are best understood as divine capacities or 
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powers. Possibilia are therefore not fundamentally dependent on God’s 
mind but on the capacities of God’s will, which creates genuinely novel 
objects whose determinate specificity is logically unavailable to the divine 
mind prior to their creation.
This alternative account of possibilia is certainly intriguing, but insuf-
ficiently developed. The way in which an indeterminate continuum/power 
that essentially lacks internal individuations could be said to constitute 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of determinate 
individuals remains altogether mysterious. This matter is made more con-
fusing by Robson’s tendency to individuate continua in terms of singular 
universals interpreted as capacities to produce particulars, such as redness 
producing red objects (76). But if God’s general creative capacity is capable 
of individuation into particular continua/powers ordered to predicates or 
properties, then there is no principled reason (or at any rate Robson offers 
none) that this particularity shouldn’t go “all the way down” so as to elimi-
nate all generality in God’s creative power, e.g., by admitting individuat-
ing properties as capacities to create determinate individuals. Even with 
possibilia thus understood as rooted primarily in the divine will, God’s 
perfect self-knowledge would continue to guarantee the eternal existence 
of possibilia as representations of God’s power in the divine mind which 
are configurable into possible worlds. If, on the other hand, Robson backs 
off of capacity-individuation and says that God’s power is essentially con-
tinuous and undifferentiated, then we could nevertheless think of God’s 
mind as capable of representing the continuity of the divine will’s creative 
capacity and performing the mental operation of “carving it up” into every 
possible determinate configuration each of which constitutes a possible 
world. His voluntarism doesn’t secure indeterminacy.
In drawing out the consequences of his model for a theory of provi-
dence in Part 2 (chapters 7–9), Robson argues that whereas the merely 
“copied” objects of a Leibnizian ontology are not sufficiently independent 
from God but are merely replicated features of God’s eternal mind (there-
by courting a form of emanationism), his own view explains the clear 
individuation of the determinate world from the indeterminacy of God’s 
creative capacity (138). But this is a dubious charge which fails to appreci-
ate both the contingency of world-actualization and the difference in kind 
between properties/propositions/states of affairs and things with proper-
ties/truths/occurrences. Robson further credits a continuum analysis with 
uniquely explaining the emergence of evil as something which God could 
not have culpably known before actually creating, but to which God must 
constantly respond in a process of continued interaction with creation. 
Again, this is not divine ignorance, since prior to their determinate real-
ization, the relevant possibilities did not exist as determinate objects of 
knowledge. Evil, as a distinctly human possibility, arises from the indeter-
minate creative capacity of human agency which, like God’s, can produce 
genuine novelty from its own indeterminate potentiality, even novel-
ties capable of deforming God’s good creation. Part 3 (chapters 10–11) 
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extends this account of human creative agency to show that although it 
resembles God’s creative capacity, it crucially differs in that the novelty 
(of art, literature, invention, meanings, etc.) necessarily emerges from 
human interaction with pre-existing materials, whereas God’s creative 
capacity is entirely self-sufficient, requiring God’s will alone. In their logi-
cal dependence upon his modal theory, both Robson’s characterization of 
human freedom and his account of human creativity inherit its deficits as 
articulated above. Nevertheless, this is an engaging and highly original 
work that merits the serious consideration of anyone with a theological 
interest in the metaphysics of modality.
The End of Philosophy of Religion, by Nick Trakakis. Continuum, 2008. Pp. 
viii + 172. $120 (cloth).
VICTORIA S. HARRISON, University of Glasgow
The End of Philosophy of Religion is a book about philosophy and its practi-
tioners. At its core lies a sobering evaluation of the current state of analytic 
philosophy. Describing this form of intellectual activity as “monotonous,” 
“mournful,” and “melancholic,” Trakakis clearly believes that it has out-
lived its usefulness (1). In keeping with this view, the current resurgence 
of interest in analytic philosophy in many parts of the world is dismissed 
as akin to the “long twilight of piety and nihilism” which Nietzsche pre-
dicted would follow the death of God (1).
As Trakakis explains in chapter 1, the type of philosophy whose demise 
he celebrates is modeled on the natural sciences. He argues that its core prob-
lem is that, unlike the objects of natural science, the objects of philosophi-
cal inquiry are not, and never could be, rationally comprehensible. Thus, 
allowing the model of natural science to shape the practice of philosophy 
has led to a dead end. Trakakis compares the “endlessly futile attempts” 
of analytic philosophers “to render everything rationally comprehensible” 
to Ad Reinhardt’s preoccupation with painting black canvases (1). Just as 
Reinhardt’s paintings were intended to symbolize the point at which no 
further development in painting was possible, analytic philosophers have 
reached the point at which they can make no further progress. The End of 
Philosophy of Religion is a sustained attempt to persuade others to share this 
view by focusing on a specific instance of this mootedly futile philosophical 
enterprise, namely analytic philosophy of religion. Trakakis believes that 
the failure of analytic philosophy is nowhere more apparent than in the 
philosophy of religion, so he uses this sub-discipline to bring into sharper 
focus his assessment of the analytic tradition as a whole.
Chapter 2 deploys the problem of evil, and the way it is typically han-
dled by analytic philosophers of religion, to illustrate the malaise which 
he believes afflicts the sub-discipline. I agree with Trakakis that writing 
